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ability than individual investors in China. Controlling for other factors, we ﬁnd that insti-
tutional investors increase (decrease) their shareholdings in stocks that subsequently exhi-
bit positive (negative) short- and long-term cumulative abnormal returns. In contrast,
individual investors decrease (increase) their shareholdings in stocks that subsequently
exhibit positive (negative) short- and long-term cumulative abnormal returns. These ﬁnd-
ings indicate that institutional investors have superior stock selection ability in China.
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Institutional investors are playing an increasingly important role in global capital markets. In 2005, institutional investors
held 65% of the equity in ﬁrms listed on the NYSE/AMEX, indicating a compound annual growth rate of 6.3% over the past 25
years (Agarwal, 2005). In China, institutional investors held 44% of the tradable equity value in the stock market in July 2007,
an increase of 25% since the end of 2004. To identify proﬁtable investments, institutional investors incur large expenses on
stock selection. As indicated by Kent et al. (1997), total costs in the mutual fund industry exceed $10 billion per year and
more than half of these expenses are incurred in their stock selection efforts. However, the extent to which institutional
investors’ stock selection costs and efforts are transformed into superior stock selection remains an important and open re-
search question for both practitioners and academic researchers. While there is already a large body of literature on this is-
sue, the results have been mixed. Further research on this issue, particularly in the context of China, provides us with a
greater understanding of investor behavior in the stock market.
A number of academic studies have examined the stock selection ability of mutual funds. Beginning with Jensen (1968),
most academic studies have concluded that mutual funds do not have superior stock selection ability. Later studies have
come to similar conclusions, including Chang and Lewellen (1984), Malkiel (1995) and Gruber (1996). Most recently, Fama
and French (2010) ﬁnd that the aggregate portfolio of actively managed US equity mutual funds is close to the marketnal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.
served.
(Y. Deng).
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that few funds produce benchmark-adjusted excess returns sufﬁcient to cover their costs. However, the results of other stud-
ies, such as Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Lee and Rahman (1991), Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Hendricks et al. (1993),
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Womack (1996), Bello and Janjigian (1997), Kent et al. (1997) and Chen et al. (2000), sug-
gest that mutual funds in the US do have some stock selection ability.
More recently, studies have started investigating the trading of individual investors relative to institutional investors. San
(2007) ﬁnds that individual investors are more likely to realize their proﬁts by selling their holdings and their stock selection
earned about 2% per month more than institutional investors in the late 1990s bubble. Kaniel et al. (2008) ﬁnd that individ-
ual investors tend to buy stocks following a price decline in the previous month and sell following a price increase. They
document positive excess returns in the month following intense buying by individual investors and negative excess returns
after selling by individual investors. Because institutional investors are trading in the same markets as individual investors,
these results suggest that individual investors are better at stock selection than institutional investors.
Although these studies have frequently provided important insights into US markets and US institutional investors, the
applicability of these ﬁndings to other markets is questionable because of institutional and environmental differences be-
tween countries and regions. In fact, a number of researchers have been working on this issue. Kang and Stulz (1997) study
stock ownership in Japanese ﬁrms by non-Japanese investors from 1975 to 1991. Their results suggest that foreign investors,
mostly foreign institutional investors, have superior stock selection ability in Japan. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) ﬁnd that
foreign investors, mostly institutional investors, seem to outperform the portfolios of households in Finland. Seasholes
(2000) ﬁnds that foreign institutional investors buy (sell) ahead of good (bad) earnings announcements in Taiwan, whereas
local investors do the opposite. These ﬁndings suggest that institutional investors have superior stock selection ability in
these markets. Other studies suggest that institutional investors do not have superior stock selection ability in other coun-
tries, such as Korea (Choe et al., 2001) and Turkey (Aragon et al., 2007). Taken together, the evidence indicates that institu-
tional and environmental differences between markets are important.
Most of the above studies focus on the US market. They use indirect methods, Jensen’s alpha or a decomposition of Jen-
sen’s alpha, or a Treynor-Mazuy model, a modiﬁed security market line approach ﬁrst suggested by Treynor and Mazuy
(1966) and later reﬁned by Bhattacharya and Pﬂeiderer (1983), to examine the stock selection ability of institutional inves-
tors through analysis of their performance. The key is to decompose the excess performance of institutional investors into
two sources: stock selection ability and timing ability. Bollen and Busse (2001) use daily tests that are more powerful than
the previously used monthly tests to examine the timing ability of mutual funds and ﬁnd that mutual funds may possess
better timing ability than previously documented. San (2007) provides a possible explanation for the inferior performance
of institutional investors, which are found to hold winners too long and miss-time momentum cycles.
With its increasing economic scale and growing stock market, China is playing an increasingly signiﬁcant role in global
capital markets. In July 2009, the market value of stocks in China’s capital market reached US$3.2 trillion, ranking China sec-
ond worldwide. However, the literature covering institutional investors in China is scarce. Table 1 compares the performance
of mutual funds and the market index in China. It shows that more than 50% of both open funds and closed-end funds out-
perform the market index (net of management fees). However, closed-end funds insigniﬁcantly outperform the market, indi-Table 1
Performance comparison between mutual funds and the market index in China. This table reports the performance (net of fees) comparison between mutual
funds and the market index in China from 2001 to 2010. Panel A, Panel B, Panel C and Panel D report the results based on monthly, quarterly, half-yearly and
yearly averaged daily performance, respectively.
N Fund Market Fund-Market T-Value Proportion outperforming (%)
Panel A: Monthly averaged daily performance (%)
Closed-end funds 300 0.1465 0.0181 0.1646 1.61 63.33
Open funds 23,717 0.0676 0.0309 0.0367*** 12.22 54.37
Total 24,017 0.0686 0.0302 0.0383*** 11.86 54.48
Panel B: Quarterly averaged daily performance (%)
Closed-end funds 83 0.1746 0.0009 0.1755 1.28 57.88
Open funds 7692 0.0735 0.0449 0.0286*** 12.30 60.70
Total 7775 0.0746 0.0444 0.0302*** 11.05 60.67
Panel C: Half-yearly averaged daily performance (%)
Closed-end funds 39 0.2002 0.0109 0.1893 1.27 58.97
Open funds 3720 0.0704 0.0405 0.0299*** 9.66 61.53
Total 3759 0.0718 0.0402 0.0315*** 9.19 61.51
Panel D: Yearly averaged daily performance (%)
Closed-end funds 14 0.0323 0.0150 0.0473 1.49 71.43
Open funds 1690 0.0730 0.0447 0.0282*** 9.59 68.22
Total 1704 0.0726 0.0443 0.0284*** 9.69 68.25
⁄Denote signiﬁcance at the conﬁdence level of 10%.
⁄⁄Denote signiﬁcance at the conﬁdence level of 5%.
*** Denote signiﬁcance at the conﬁdence level of 1%.
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returns. Open funds consistently outperform the market and they comprise more than half of the mutual fund industry
in China. In total, the annualized data shows that mutual funds in China outperform the market by 0.0284% per day,1 sug-
gesting the huge effort that mutual funds put into research and stock selection is not a zero-sum game. Furthermore, Yu et al.
(2009) investigate differences in the returns between institutional and individual investors and ﬁnd that institutional investors
outperform individual investors in China. However, they do not document the performance difference due to stock selection.
We use unique data on the shareholdings of both institutional and individual investors to directly investigate whether
institutional investors have better stock selection ability than individuals in China. Based on the intuitive idea that institu-
tional investors will be more likely to buy future winners and sell future losers than individual investors, we ﬁrst sort stocks
by future price performance into ten deciles and examine the difference between institutional and individual investor daily
trading among deciles. The sorting evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that institutional investors have better stock
selection ability than individual investors. We also regress institutional and individual investor daily trading on future stock
performance while controlling for other factors, such as size and momentum effects. We ﬁnd that institutional investors in-
crease (decrease) their shareholdings in stocks that subsequently exhibit positive (negative) short- and long-term cumula-
tive abnormal returns. In contrast, individual investors decrease (increase) their shareholdings in stocks that subsequently
exhibit positive (negative) short- and long-term cumulative abnormal returns. These ﬁndings indicate that institutional
investors have superior stock selection ability in China.
To our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to use daily trading data for institutional and individual investors to directly
examine whether institutional investors have superior stock selection ability. We ﬁnd that institutional investors have better
stock selection ability than individual investors in China. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 re-
views the extant literature and develops our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research design. The empirical re-
sults are provided in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.2. Literature review and hypotheses
2.1. Literature review
Trueman (1988) presents a theoretical model showing that the incentive for one type of institutional investor – managers
of investment funds – to engage in noise trading arises because of the positive signal that the level of the manager’s trading
provides about his or her ability to collect private information concerning current and potential investments. If the man-
ager’s compensation is directly related to investors’ perceptions of his or her ability, the manager will trade more frequently
than is justiﬁed on the basis of his or her private information. This suggests that institutional investors are not necessarily
rational investors with superior stock selection ability.
A number of empirical studies focus on mutual funds. Jensen (1968) was the ﬁrst to evaluate the performance of mutual
funds over the period 1945–1964 and documents evidence that mutual funds do not have signiﬁcant stock selection ability.
Similar results are found in subsequent research, such as Chang and Lewellen (1984), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996) and Kent
et al. (1997). However, Grinblatt and Titman (1989) examined the 1975–1984 quarterly holdings of a sample of mutual funds
and found that the risk-adjusted gross returns of some funds were signiﬁcantly positive. Other research also suggests that
mutual funds have some stock selection ability, such as Lee and Rahman (1991), Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Hendricks
et al. (1993), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Womack (1996), Bello and Janjigian (1997), Kent et al. (1997) and Chen
et al. (2000). Moreover, Chen et al. (2000) document evidence that funds with the best past performance have better
stock-picking skills than funds with the worst past performance, suggesting that stock selection ability may differ among
institutional investors.
Researchers have also examined the stock-picking ability of other types of institutional investors. Womack (1996) ana-
lyzes the new buy and sell recommendations of security analysts at major US brokerage ﬁrms and ﬁnds that analysts appear
to have stock-picking ability. Metrick (1999) analyzes the equity-portfolio recommendations made by investment newslet-
ters between July 1980 and December 1996 and ﬁnds no signiﬁcant evidence of superior stock-picking ability for the overall
sample of 153 newsletters, suggesting that investment newsletters in the US do not have superior stock selection ability.
Other studies have recently investigated trading by individual investors relative to institutional investors. San (2007) uses
data on institutional holdings and trading volume for all NYSE and Nasdaq-NM stocks from 1986 to 2001 and examines
whether trading by institutional investors is more proﬁtable than trading by individual investors. He ﬁnds that individual
investors realize superior gains by selling and that their trading was about 2% per month more proﬁtable than institutional
investors in the late 1990s bubble. He also provides a possible explanation for the inferior performance of institutional inves-
tors, as they tend to hold winners too long and miss-time momentum cycles. Kaniel et al. (2008) investigate the dynamic
relation between net individual investor trading and short-horizon returns for a large cross-section of NYSE stocks. They ﬁnd1 There may be a question as to why individuals do not invest all of their money in mutual funds given that they outperform the market index in China. This
can be partly explained by behavioral considerations, such as people preferring to control their own money or that they ex ante expect that they can beat
mutual funds because some mutual funds do underperform the market index ex post. The sometimes irrational trading behavior of mutual fund managers
disclosed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission may also dent individuals’ conﬁdence in mutual funds. Moreover, some people in China regard
investing in the stock market by themselves as an interesting form of entertainment.
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also document positive excess returns in the month following intense buying by individual investors and negative excess
returns after selling by individual investors. Because institutional investors are trading opponents of individual investors,
institutional investors suffer from negative excess returns in the month following buying and positive excess returns after
selling. These ﬁndings indicate that individual investors have better stock selection ability than institutional investors.
The above mentioned literature concentrates on institutional investors in the US, however, researchers are increasingly
studying institutional investors in other markets. Kang and Stulz (1997) studied stock ownership in Japanese ﬁrms by non-
Japanese investors from 1975 to 1991. They ﬁnd that foreign investors, mostly foreign institutional investors, outperform
domestic investors in Japan. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) conducted a simultaneous analysis of the investment behavior
and performance of various investor types and ﬁnd that foreign investors, mostly institutional investors, seem to outperform
theportfolios of households, even after controlling for behavioral differences showing that foreign investors tend tobemomen-
tum investors andhouseholds tend tobe contrarians. Seasholes (2000)ﬁnds that foreign institutional investors buy (sell) ahead
of good (bad) earnings announcements in Taiwan,whereas local investors do the opposite. Using trading data fromKorea from
December 1996 to November 1998, Choe et al. (2001) ﬁnd that foreign investors, all of whomare institutional investors, buy at
signiﬁcantly higher prices and sell at signiﬁcantly lower prices than domestic individuals for medium and large trades. They
also ﬁnd that foreign institutional investors are at less of a disadvantage relative to domestic institutions than relative to
domestic individuals. However, for large trades, the disadvantage of foreign institutional investors seems to persist.
Recently, Aragon et al. (2007) examined whether institutional investors have superior stock selection ability relative to
individual investors in Turkey. They compared the portfolio returns of each investor group with a benchmark portfolio that
has the same exposure to local market, size, and book-to-market factors and estimate the intercepts of the domestic market
model to be 7.71% and 7.12% for individual investors and institutional investors, respectively, with the difference between
these estimates statistically insigniﬁcant. They also use the ‘‘benchmark-free’’ measure developed by Grinblatt and Titman
(1993) and estimate the annualized risk-adjusted returns as 0.08% and 0.45% for individual investor and institutional
investor portfolios respectively, with the difference statistically insigniﬁcant.
In summary, the mixed results in the extant literature indicate that the extent to which institutional investors’ stock
selection costs and efforts are transformed into superior stock selection ability remains an open research question. Further-
more, the stock selection abilities of institutional investors also seem to differ across markets.
2.2. Hypothesis development
Assuming that institutional investors have better stock selection ability than individuals, they should be able to form a
more accurate estimate of the intrinsic value of companies to better predict future stock price performance. Thus, institu-
tional investors will buy stocks which they believe are going to be future winners and sell those which they predict to be
future losers, which will be more accurate than individual investors’ predictions. Furthermore, since individual investors
are the trading counterparty of institutional investors, they are more likely to buy future losers and sell future winners.
Therefore, our hypotheses are as follows:
H1: Changes in institutional investor ownership are positively correlated with subsequent abnormal returns.
H2: Changes in individual investor ownership are negatively correlated with subsequent abnormal returns.
3. Research design
3.1. Data and sample selection
Institutional and individual investor ownership data are drawn from Topview software, an ofﬁcial information source of
daily ownership held by three different groups of investors provided by the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE). The data service
is offered to investors at the price of over RMB 19,800 per year, which is hardly affordable to most individual investors in
China. Topview classiﬁes all investors in the stock market into three categories: institutions, individuals and non-profes-
sional legal persons. Institutional investors conceptually include mutual funds, qualiﬁed foreign institutional investors,
insurance companies, social insurance funds and securities companies.2 For each day from June 1st, 2007 to December
31st, 2008, Topview reports the total ownership held by each of the three groups of investors on each of the 849 stocks listed
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Data on stock returns and control variables are drawn from the China Stock Market and
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.
Deng and Lee (2000) ﬁnd that institutional investors never trade on certain stocks during the sample period, with small
ﬁrm size as the main driver. We therefore delete 29 ﬁrms from the original sample because institutional investors never2 The Qualiﬁed Foreign Institutional Investor program is a Chinese program that was launched in 2002 to allow licensed foreign investors to buy and sell A
stocks in China’s mainland stock exchanges (in Shanghai and Shenzhen). Chinese mainland stock exchanges were previously closed off to foreign investors due
to China’s tight capital controls which restrict the movement of assets in-and-out of the country. As of February 2009, a total of 79 foreign institutional
investors had been approved under the QFII program. Foreign access to China’s A stocks are still limited, with quotas placed under the QFII program amounting
to US$30 billion.
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quent abnormal returns. Table 2 describes the sample selection process and Table 3 breaks down the institutional and indi-
vidual ownership data by year.
Table 3 illustrates that institutional investor shareholdings in the SSE average 13.84%, much lower than the 65% in the
NYSE/AMEX (Agarwal, 2005). Institutional investors increased their shareholdings in 2007 and decreased them in 2008,
whereas individuals were net buyers during the whole period. Moreover, net daily changes in both institutional and individ-
ual ownership are small, averaging less than 0.01%.
3.2. Variable deﬁnitions
Change in ownership is measured as the daily ownership change between the measurement day and the previous trading
day:Table 2
Sample
and sto
Firm
Dele
Dele
ab
Fina
Table 3
Descrip
and bot
Varia
Insti
INST
Indiv
INDIChange in institutional ownership of stock i on date t ðINSTCHi;tÞ
¼ Institutional ownership on date t ðINSTi;tÞ  Institutional ownership on date t  1 ðINSTi;t1Þ; ð1ÞandChange in individual ownership ðINDICHi;tÞ ¼ Individual ownership on date t ðINDIi;tÞ
 Individual ownership on date t  1 ðINDIi;t1Þ: ð2ÞSubsequent abnormal returns are obtained by summing the daily abnormal returns (ARi,t+n) over the measurement
window:Subsequent abnormal returns ðCARi;tþ1;tþNÞ ¼
XN
n¼1
ARi;tþn; ð3Þwhere ARi,t+n is calculated as the raw return of the stock minus the corresponding daily average-weighted return of the mar-
ket portfolio of the stocks with institutional investor trading.
For the short-term window for measuring subsequent abnormal returns, we select the subsequent one day (N = 1) and
subsequent ﬁve days (N = 5). We also choose the subsequent 30 days (N = 30) and subsequent 120 days (N = 120), because
institutional investors in China change their stock portfolios relatively frequently during the year. Fig. 1 illustrates the time-
line and measurement of our dependent and explanatory variables.
Tests of the relationship between changes in institutional (individual) ownership and subsequent abnormal returns are
conducted while controlling for contemporary and historical returns, prior changes in institutional (individual) ownership,selection criteria. This table describes the sample selection process. We delete stocks that no institutions had traded during the whole sample period
ck-day observations with missing data on changes in institutional and individual ownership or subsequent abnormal returns.
Firm
observations
Stock-day
observations
s with reported daily institutional and individual ownership (June, 2007–December, 2008) 849 311,515
te stocks that no institutions traded during the whole sample period (29) (9543)
te stock-days with missing data on changes in institutional and individual ownership or subsequent
normal returns
0 (822)
l sample 820 301,150
tive statistics of ownership variables. This table describes the institutional and individual shareholding data. All the variables are winsorized at the top
tom 1 percent of the ﬁnal sample.
ble Year N Mean Median STD Min Max
tutional ownership (%) 2007 110,492 15.1841 3.5200 21.2380 0.0000 76.7200
2008 191,480 13.0599 3.1600 18.7535 0.0000 76.7200
Total 301,972 13.8372 3.2750 19.7255 0.0000 76.7200
CH (%) 2007 109,684 0.0044 0.0000 0.3311 1.3000 1.1900
2008 191,468 0.0050 0.0000 0.2642 1.3000 1.1900
Total 301,152 0.0016 0.0000 0.2904 1.3000 1.1900
idual ownership (%) 2007 110,492 73.0289 81.0400 24.3095 10.1800 99.4600
2008 191,480 70.5002 76.7300 23.3609 10.1800 99.4600
Total 301,972 71.4255 78.2000 23.7436 10.1800 99.4600
CH (%) 2007 109,684 0.0068 0.0000 0.3987 1.4010 1.4200
2008 191,468 0.0094 0.0000 0.3105 1.4010 1.4200
Total 301,152 0.0084 0.0000 0.3453 1.4010 1.4200
date t+Ndate tdate t-1
Change in ownership 
INSTCHt
INDICHt
Subsequent abnormal returns 
CAR1,N
time 
date t+1
Fig. 1. Timeline and measurement of main variables.
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follows:
ARt = daily abnormal returns for the stock on the measurement day.
ARtj = daily abnormal returns for the stock j days before the measurement day (j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
INSTCHtj = daily change in institutional ownership j days before the measurement day (j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
INDICHtj = daily change in individual ownership j days before the measurement day (j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
INSTt1 = institutional ownership at the end of the day before the measurement day.
INDIt1 = individual ownership at the end of the day before the measurement day.
SIZE = log of the market value of the ﬁrm’s equity at the end of the day before the measurement day.
Year = dummy vector indicating the year of the measurement day.
Weekday = dummy vector indicating the weekday of the measurement day.
Industry = dummy vector indicating the three-digit CSRC standard industry code for the ﬁrm.
Table 4 summarizes the variable deﬁnitions.
3.3. Research method
We ﬁrst sort stocks by future price performance into ten deciles and examine the difference between institutional inves-
tor and individual investor daily trading among the deciles. The following two regressions form the basis of our cross-sec-
tional tests:Table 4
Variabl
Vari
Pane
Chan
Chan
Pane
Subs
Pane
Cont
Mom
Prior
o
Prior
o
Begi
Begi
Firm
Year
Wee
InduINSTCHi;t ¼ a0 þ a1CARi;tþ1;tþN þ a2ARi;t þ a3ARi;t1 þ a4ARi;t2 þ a5ARi;t3 þ a6ARi;t4 þ a7ARi;t5 þ a8INSTCHi;t1
þ a9INSTCHi;t2 þ a10INSTCHi;t3 þ a11INSTCHi;t4 þ a12INSTCHi;t5 þ a13INSTi;t1 þ a14SIZEþ v1Year
þ /1Weekdayþu1Industryþ ei;t ð4Þe deﬁnitions.
able Label Deﬁnition
l A: Dependent variables
ge in institutional ownership INSTCH Daily change in institutional ownership between the measurement day and the nearest previous
trading day
ge in individual ownership INDICH Daily change in individual ownership between the measurement day and the nearest previous
trading day
l B: Explanatory variables
equent abnormal returns CAR11 Abnormal returns on the subsequent day following the measurement day
CAR15 Cumulative abnormal returns during the subsequent 5 days following the measurement day
CAR130 Cumulative abnormal returns during the subsequent 30 days following the measurement day
CAR1120 Cumulative abnormal returns during the subsequent 120 days following the measurement day
l C: Control variables
emporary abnormal return AR Daily abnormal returns on the measurement day
entum returns ARi Daily abnormal returns i days before the measurement day for the stock (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
changes in institutional
wnership
INSTCHi Daily change in institutional ownership i days before the measurement day (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
changes in individual
wnership
INDICHi Daily change in individual ownership i days before the measurement day (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
nning institutional ownership INST1 Institutional ownership at the end of the day before the measurement day
nning individual ownership INDI1 Individual ownership at the end of the day before the measurement day
size SIZE Log of the market value of equity at the end of the day before the measurement day
effect Year Dummy vector indicating the year of the measurement day
kday effect Weekday Dummy vector indicating the weekday of the measurement day
stry effect Industry Dummy vector indicating the three-digit CSRC standard industry code
Table 5
Descriptive statistics of independent variables. This table reports the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and the number of observations
(N) of the independent variables. All variables are deﬁned as in Table 4. All the variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent of the ﬁnal sample, and
SIZE exhibited in the table is the market value of equity in units of Million RMB ¥.
Variable N Mean Median STD Min Max
Panel A: Subsequent abnormal returns
AR1 301,970 0.0001 0.0033 0.0283 0.0644 0.0920
CAR15 301,942 0.0004 0.0059 0.0643 0.1527 0.1998
CAR130 301,892 0.0018 0.0126 0.1440 0.3401 0.4468
CAR1120 301,301 0.0045 0.0195 0.2628 0.6203 0.7277
Panel B: Control variables
AR 301,952 0.0001 0.0033 0.0283 0.0644 0.0924
AR_1 301,931 0.0001 0.0033 0.0285 0.0644 0.0929
AR_2 301,910 0.0001 0.0034 0.0285 0.0644 0.0931
AR_3 301,889 0.0001 0.0034 0.0285 0.0644 0.0930
AR_4 301,868 0.0001 0.0034 0.0285 0.0643 0.0930
AR_5 301,847 0.0001 0.0034 0.0285 0.0643 0.0929
INSTCH_1 (%) 300,332 0.0017 0.0000 0.2905 1.3000 1.1900
INSTCH_2 (%) 299,512 0.0017 0.0000 0.2906 1.3000 1.1900
INSTCH_3 (%) 298,692 0.0017 0.0000 0.2906 1.3000 1.1900
INSTCH_4 (%) 297,872 0.0018 0.0000 0.2907 1.3000 1.1900
INSTCH_5 (%) 297,052 0.0018 0.0000 0.2909 1.3000 1.1900
INDICH_1 (%) 300,332 0.0086 0.0000 0.3456 1.4030 1.4240
INDICH_2 (%) 299,512 0.0086 0.0000 0.3459 1.4060 1.4250
INDICH_3 (%) 298,692 0.0087 0.0000 0.3459 1.4030 1.4270
INDICH_4 (%) 297,872 0.0087 0.0000 0.3463 1.4060 1.4300
INDICH_5 (%) 297,052 0.0088 0.0000 0.3467 1.4090 1.4300
INST_1 (%) 301,152 13.8429 3.2790 19.7310 0.0000 76.7270
INDI_1 (%) 301,152 71.4338 78.2100 23.7426 10.1890 99.4600
SIZE (Million RMB) 301,951 14,875.95 3,691.36 43,684.37 545.36 331,294.45
Panel A: Short-term subsequent stock performance and investor trading 
-3.0%
-1.5%
0.0%
1.5%
3.0%
4.5%
-15% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15%
Future performance
Investor trading
INSTCH INDICH
Panel B: Long-term subsequent stock performance and investor trading 
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
-60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60%
Future performance
Investor trading
INSTCH INDICH
Fig. 2. Subsequent stock performance and investor trading.
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Table 6
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þ b9INDICHi;t2 þ b10INDICHi;t3 þ b11INDICHi;t4 þ b12INDICHi;t5 þ b13INDIi;t1 þ b14SIZEþ v2Year
þ /2Weekdayþu2Industryþ di;t ð5Þ4. Empirical results
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics of the independent variables for the total sample. It shows that stock perfor-
mance in the sample is diversely distributed. Daily abnormal returns range from 6.44% to 9.20% and weekly (ﬁve trading
day) cumulative abnormal returns range from 15.27% to 19.98%. From a long-term perspective, monthly (30 trading day)
cumulative abnormal returns range from 34.01% to 44.68% and half-yearly (120 trading day) cumulative abnormal returns
range from 62.03% to 72.77%. Firm size varies widely, with the market value of equity ranging from RMB 545.36 million to
RMB 331,294.45 million.4.1. Sorting evidence
Panel A of Fig. 2 plots the average investor trading and short-term (ﬁve trading day) future performance of the 10 deciles
sorted by future performance. Basically, it shows that institutional investors buy stocks with positive future abnormal re-
turns and sell stocks with negative future abnormal returns. The higher (lower) the future performance ranking, the more
institutional investors buy (sell). The opposite is true for individual investors. The average investor trading and long-term
(120 trading days) future performance of the 10 deciles sorted by future performance is plotted in Panel B of Fig. 2. It doc-
uments a similar trend to Panel A for the correlation between long-term subsequent stock performance and investor trading.
In summary, Fig. 2 illustrates that changes in institutional (individual) ownership are positively (negatively) correlated with
subsequent abnormal returns.
Table 6 reports the average daily change in institutional and individual ownership of each decile sorted by subsequent
abnormal returns. Several patterns are worth noting. First, institutional investors sell stocks with low-ranked future abnor-of subsequent CARs. This table reports the ranking of stocks by both short-term and long-term subsequent CARs. Stocks are ranked according to
ent CARs, sorted into decile, and the equally weighted average changes in institutional and individual ownership within each decile are reported. T-
s are stated in parentheses.
Ranked by CARs(1,1) Ranked by CARs(1,5)
rankings CAR11 INSTCH INDICH CAR15 INSTCH INDICH
l A: Sorted by short-term subsequent CARs
est 0.044 0.030 0.047 0.105 0.025 0.043
0.026 0.011 0.023 0.061 0.011 0.022
0.018 0.005 0.014 0.041 0.010 0.018
0.012 0.002 0.009 0.026 0.006 0.014
0.006 0.004 0.011 0.013 0.009 0.017
0.000 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.009
0.006 0.000 0.005 0.016 0.000 0.006
0.014 0.003 0.001 0.035 0.005 0.002
0.027 0.012 0.011 0.062 0.016 0.014
est 0.059 0.022 0.018 0.128 0.028 0.029
est–Lowest 0.103*** 0.053*** 0.066*** 0.233*** 0.053*** 0.072***
(858.11) (19.13) (19.67) (912.62) (19.58) (22.17)
Ranked by CARs(1,30) Ranked by CARs(1,120)
rankings CAR130 INSTCH INDICH CAR1120 INSTCH INDICH
l B: Sorted by long-term subsequent CARs
est 0.238 0.015 0.032 0.445 0.003 0.017
0.140 0.007 0.020 0.266 0.009 0.021
0.094 0.008 0.017 0.177 0.005 0.014
0.059 0.008 0.016 0.109 0.005 0.011
0.028 0.008 0.014 0.049 0.003 0.011
0.003 0.006 0.011 0.010 0.003 0.010
0.037 0.002 0.006 0.075 0.002 0.008
0.078 0.003 0.001 0.153 0.002 0.003
0.137 0.011 0.008 0.262 0.006 0.003
est 0.284 0.024 0.023 0.501 0.007 0.007
est–Lowest 0.522*** 0.039*** 0.055*** 0.945*** 0.010*** 0.023***
(913.63) (14.45) (17.37) (1,072.97) (4.01) (7.51)
ote signiﬁcance at the conﬁdence level of 1%.
Table 7
Cross-sectional regression tests of changes in ownership on short-term future CARs. This table reports the estimates from multivariate regressions of change in
institutional ownership on short-term subsequent CARs. Refer to Table 4 for variable deﬁnitions. T-statistics are stated in parentheses.
Variable INSTCH INSTCH INSTCH INSTCH INSTCH INSTCH
Panel A: Cross-sectional regressions of changes in institutional ownership
Intercept 0.002*** 0.076*** 0.002*** 0.085*** 0.002*** 0.082***
(2.99) (5.93) (2.87) (6.662) (2.94) (6.39)
CAR(1,1) 0.459*** 0.247***
(24.52) (14.31)
CAR(1,5) 0.223*** 0.187***
(27.07) (24.68)
CAR(2,5) 0.167*** 0.171***
(18.16) (20.27)
AR 1.465*** 1.488*** 1.498***
(84.89) (86.44) (86.96)
AR_1 0.336*** 0.348*** 0.337***
(19.27) (19.92) (19.33)
AR_2 0.191*** 0.205*** 0.201***
(10.96) (11.72) (11.50)
AR_3 0.059*** 0.073*** 0.071***
(3.38) (4.17) (4.07)
AR_4 0.006 0.011 0.003
(0.33) (0.64) (0.20)
AR_5 0.017 0.018 0.014
(0.98) (1.04) (0.78)
INSTCH_1 0.267*** 0.266*** 0.267***
(145.82) (145.42) (145.79)
INSTCH_2 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.089***
(47.34) (47.14) (47.27)
INSTCH_3 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063***
(33.27) (33.14) (33.18)
INSTCH_4 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044***
(23.19) (23.18) (23.22)
INSTCH_5 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(14.84) (14.87) (14.87)
INST_1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(12.16) (12.54) (12.39)
SIZE 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(6.32) (7.07) (6.79)
Year, Weekday and Industry No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 301,150 297,050 301,142 297,042 301,142 297,042
Adj. R-square (%) 0.20 16.21 0.24 16.32 0.11 16.27
Variable INDICH INDICH INDICH INDICH INDICH INDICH
Panel B: Cross-sectional regressions of changes in individual ownership
Intercept 0.008*** 0.112*** 0.008*** 0.125*** 0.008*** 0.120***
(13.36) (6.79) (13.22) (7.55) (13.29) (7.25)
CAR(1,1) 0.584*** 0.348***
(26.26) (16.64)
CAR(1,5) 0.298*** 0.247***
(30.43) (26.79)
CAR(2,5) 0.231*** 0.222***
(21.17) (21.60)
AR 1.487*** 1.519*** 1.532***
(70.96) (72.70) (73.25)
AR_1 0.427*** 0.440*** 0.427***
(20.20) (20.87) (20.22)
AR_2 0.218*** 0.236*** 0.230***
(10.33) (11.16) (10.90)
AR_3 0.046** 0.064*** 0.061***
(2.16) (3.03) (2.91)
AR_4 0.007 0.001 0.011
(0.34) (0.04) (0.52)
AR_5 0.047** 0.048** 0.042**
(2.23) (2.28) (1.99)
INDICH_1 0.229*** 0.228*** 0.228***
(124.96) (124.47) (124.90)
INDICH_2 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.087***
(46.46) (46.17) (46.33)
INDICH_3 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058***
(31.06) (30.87) (30.95)
(continued on next page)
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Table 7 (continued)
Variable INSTCH INSTCH INSTCH INSTCH INSTCH INSTCH
INDICH_4 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.043***
(22.88) (22.82) (22.91)
INDICH_5 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(14.84) (14.83) (14.85)
INDI_1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(12.81) (13.22) (13.04)
SIZE 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(5.51) (6.31) (6.00)
Year, Weekday and Industry No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 301,150 297,050 301,142 297,042 301,142 297,042
Adj. R-square (%) 0.23 12.36 0.31 12.49 0.15 12.42
** Denote signiﬁcance at the conﬁdence level of 5%.
*** Denote signiﬁcance at the conﬁdence level of 1%.
116 Y. Deng, Y. Xu / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 107–119mal returns and buy stocks with high-ranked future abnormal returns, with a statistically and economically signiﬁcant dif-
ference. Second, the daily change in institutional ownership basically increases with the ranking of subsequent abnormal
returns, whereas individual investor ownership decreases. These patterns hold regardless of whether they are measured
in the short-term or long-term, and vice versa for individual investors. In summary, this initial evidence shows that institu-
tional investors have better stock picking ability than individual investors.
4.2. Regression tests on short-term subsequent abnormal returns
Table 7 reports the results of the cross-sectional regression tests of changes in institutional and individual ownership on
short-term subsequent abnormal returns. Panel A shows that institutional investors increase (decrease) their shareholdings
in stocks that subsequently exhibit positive (negative) short-term cumulative abnormal returns. In particular, institutional
investor ownership increases (decreases) by 0.247% as subsequent one-day abnormal stock returns increase (decrease) by
1%. In addition, institutional investor ownership increases (decreases) by 0.187% as subsequent ﬁve-day cumulative abnor-
mal returns increase (decrease) by 1%. Therefore, changes in institutional ownership are signiﬁcantly positively related to
short-term future abnormal returns, as Hypothesis 1 predicts.
Panel B illustrates that individual investors decrease (increase) their shareholdings in stocks that subsequently exhibit
positive (negative) short-term cumulative abnormal returns. In particular, individual ownership decreases (increases) by
0.348% as subsequent one-day abnormal stock returns increase (decrease) by 1%. Furthermore, individual investor own-
ership decreases (increases) by 0.247% of the stock as subsequent ﬁve-day cumulative abnormal returns increase (de-
crease) by 1%. Thus, we ﬁnd that changes in individual ownership are signiﬁcantly negatively related to short-term
future abnormal returns.
4.3. Regression tests on long-term subsequent abnormal returns
Table 8 reports the cross-sectional regression results for changes in institutional and individual ownership on long-term
subsequent abnormal returns. Panel A shows that institutional investors increase (decrease) their shareholdings in stocks
that subsequently exhibit positive (negative) long-term cumulative abnormal returns. More speciﬁcally, institutional inves-
tor ownership increases (decreases) by 0.061% as subsequent 30-day cumulative abnormal returns increase (decrease) by 1%.
In addition, institutional ownership increases (decreases) by 0.018% as subsequent 120-day abnormal stock returns increase
(decrease) by 1%. This illustrates that change in institutional ownership is signiﬁcantly positively related to long-term future
performance, as Hypothesis 1 predicts. However, when we run the regression on changes in institutional ownership over the
long window [30 and 120 day] abnormal returns, it turns out to be insigniﬁcant, suggesting that institutional investors short-
sightedly focus on short-term returns more than long-term returns.
Panel B shows that individual investors decrease (increase) their shareholdings in stocks that subsequently exhibit
positive (negative) long-term cumulative abnormal returns. In particular, individual investor ownership decreases (in-
creases) by 0.084% as subsequent 30-day abnormal stock returns increase (decrease) by 1%. Furthermore, individual
investor ownership decreases (increases) by 0.026% as subsequent 120-day cumulative abnormal returns increase (de-
crease) by 1%. Thus, we ﬁnd that changes in individual ownership are signiﬁcantly negatively related to long-term future
abnormal returns.
4.4. Sensitivity analysis
Since institutions may prefer more risky stocks that lead to higher subsequent performance, we apply risk-adjusted
abnormal returns calculated using the CAPM model as a robustness check. Beta is estimated on a daily basis for each stock,
using the return data during the 60 trading days before the measurement date (no less than 20 trading days if there is
Table 8
Cross-sectional regression tests of changes in ownership on long-term future CARs. This table reports the estimates from multivariate regressions of change in
institutional ownership on long-term subsequent CARs. Refer to Table 4 for variable deﬁnitions. T-statistics are stated in parentheses.
Variable INSTCH INSTCH INSTCH INSTCH INSTCH INSTCH
Panel A: Cross-sectional regressions of changes in institutional ownership
Intercept 0.001*** 0.093*** 0.002*** 0.094*** 0.081*** 0.071***
(2.78) (7.29) (2.90) (7.24) (6.36) (5.49)
CAR(1,30) 0.077*** 0.061***
(20.82) (18.00)
CAR(1,120) 0.017*** 0.018***
(8.30) (9.38)
CAR(5,30) 0.032***
(8.70)
CAR(30,120) 0.002
(0.78)
AR 1.491*** 1.492*** 1.488*** 1.487***
(86.58) (86.38) (86.31) (86.10)
AR_1 0.337*** 0.331*** 0.328*** 0.326***
(19.30) (18.94) (18.78) (18.65)
AR_2 0.199*** 0.193*** 0.191*** 0.189***
(11.39) (11.04) (10.95) (10.78)
AR_3 0.069*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.059***
(3.95) (3.63) (3.53) (3.37)
AR_4 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.37) (0.05) (0.04) (0.20)
AR_5 0.019 0.016 0.014 0.012
(1.12) (0.89) (0.82) (0.66)
INSTCH_1 0.267*** 0.268*** 0.268*** 0.268***
(145.76) (145.95) (146.13) (146.09)
INSTCH_2 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090***
(47.22) (47.35) (47.39) (47.42)
INSTCH_3 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063***
(33.11) (33.21) (33.23) (33.26)
INSTCH_4 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044***
(23.09) (23.19) (23.18) (23.22)
INSTCH_5 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(14.67) (14.80) (14.75) (14.82)
INST_1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(12.33) (11.83) (12.10) (12.00)
SIZE 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(7.70) (7.61) (6.75) (5.87)
Year, Weekday and Industry No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 301,092 296,992 300,501 296,401 296,992 296,401
Adj. R-square (%) 0.14 16.24 0.02 16.18 16.17 16.16
Variable INDICH INDICH INDICH INDICH INDICH INDICH
Panel B: Cross-sectional regressions of changes in individual ownership
Intercept 0.008*** 0.137*** 0.008*** 0.138*** 0.121*** 0.106***
(13.08) (8.26) (13.20) (8.20) (7.29) (6.36)
CAR(1,30) 0.109*** 0.084***
(24.91) (20.39)
CAR(1,120) 0.030*** 0.026***
(12.63) (11.30)
CAR(5,30) 0.047***
(10.56)
CAR(30,120) 0.001
(0.32)
AR 1.524*** 1.522*** 1.519*** 1.515***
(72.90) (72.62) (72.62) (72.28)
AR_1 0.427*** 0.419*** 0.415*** 0.411***
(20.24) (19.79) (19.65) (19.44)
AR_2 0.228*** 0.221*** 0.218*** 0.214***
(10.82) (10.42) (10.32) (10.10)
AR_3 0.060*** 0.053** 0.050*** 0.046***
(2.85) (2.50) (2.37) (2.19)
AR_4 0.007 0.014 0.016 0.021
(0.32) (0.68) (0.77) (0.99)
AR_5 0.049** 0.044** 0.042** 0.038**
(2.36) (2.11) (2.02) (1.83)
INDICH_1 0.228*** 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.230***
(124.80) (125.16) (125.26) (125.37)
(continued on next page)
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Table 8 (continued)
Variable INSTCH INSTCH INSTCH INSTCH INSTCH INSTCH
INDICH_2 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087***
(46.26) (46.48) (46.51) (46.60)
INDICH_3 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058***
(30.85) (31.06) (31.03) (31.16)
INDICH_4 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043***
(22.74) (22.89) (22.88) (22.97)
INDICH_5 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(14.62) (14.77) (14.74) (14.83)
INDI_1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(13.04) (12.37) (12.77) (12.60)
SIZE 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(7.12) (7.13) (6.09) (5.08)
Year, Weekday and Industry No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 301,092 296,992 300,501 296,401 296,992 296,401
Adj. R-square (%) 0.21 12.40 0.05 12.33 12.31 12.29
** Denote signiﬁcance at the conﬁdence level of 5%.
*** Denote signiﬁcance at the conﬁdence level of 1%.
118 Y. Deng, Y. Xu / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 107–119incomplete data) and our main results hold.3 We also measure the subsequent abnormal returns after institutional investors
buy or sell by longer or shorter windows, such as (+1, +2), (+1, +3) and (+1, +10) for short-term subsequent performance and (+1,
+60), (+1, +90), (+1, +240), (+1, +360) and (+1, +480) for long-term subsequent performance. Our main results still hold. We also
use total assets instead of market value to control for the ﬁrm size effect, which does not change our main results.5. Conclusions
In this paper, we use unique data on the shareholdings of both institutional and individual investors to directly investi-
gate whether institutional investors have better stock selection ability than individual investors in China. Our methodology
is based on the intuitive idea that if institutional investors are better at selecting stocks than individual investors, then insti-
tutional investors are more likely to buy future winners and sell future losers. Thus we ﬁrst sort stocks by future price per-
formance into ten deciles and examine the difference between institutional and individual investor daily trading among the
deciles. The sorting evidence supports our hypothesis that institutional investors have better stock selection ability than
individual investors.
We also regress institutional and individual investor daily trading on future stock performance while controlling for other
factors, such as size and momentum effects. We ﬁnd that institutional investors increase (decrease) their shareholdings in
stocks that subsequently exhibit positive (negative) short- and long-term cumulative abnormal returns. In contrast, individ-
ual investors decrease (increase) their shareholdings in stocks that subsequently exhibit positive (negative) short- and long-
term cumulative abnormal returns. These results indicate that institutional investors have superior stock selection ability in
China.
The empirical results in this paper are not consistent with some of the research on institutional investors in the US mar-
ket. This may suggest that institutional investors in China have more private information than those in the US. However, it is
possible that they achieve their information advantage by illegal or unethical means, i.e. through unethical channels of inside
information in a speciﬁc setting without effective regulation of insider trading. In fact, the Wall Street Journal reported on
December 2, 2010 that ‘‘Several hedge funds under scrutiny in an insider-trading investigation made big bets on health-care
stocks also being examined in the probe, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis. Hedge funds SAC Capital Advisors LP,
Diamondback Capital Management LP, Jana Partners LLC and Balyasny Asset Management LP all increased their holdings in
one or more of three health-care stocks during the quarters in which the companies announced mergers and the stock shot
up in price, according to public ﬁlings.’’ However, institutional investors have seldom been investigated and punished be-
cause of insider trading in China, although mutual fund star managers (such as Yawei Wang, etc.) often perfectly time their
trading around valuable information disclosures (such as merger and acquisition announcements, etc.) and achieve superior
performance. This suggests that China still has a long way to go in effectively regulating insider trading and improving its
stock market mechanisms.
The above conclusions are subject to the caveat that we treat all institutional investors in China as the same due to the
limited availability of detailed investor trading data. Chen et al. (2000) document evidence that stock selection abilities3 One referee also suggests that there may be reverse causality, because institutional trading may cause stock price movements or institutions may
manipulate stock prices because of the signiﬁcant amount of money they control. As we use daily data to test whether institutions have a superior ability to
pick stocks in this paper, we believe that institutions’ daily demand will only lead to contemporary stock price movements, but not in the subsequent period. If
that were the case, institutions would just buy stocks and wait for the stock prices go up. That is, institutional ownership would become higher and higher. In
our sample period from June 2007 to December 2008, however, institutional ownership decreased, as shown in Table 3. Therefore, the potential reverse
causality problem is not severe in this paper.
Y. Deng, Y. Xu / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 107–119 119amongmutual funds vary signiﬁcantly, suggesting that different institutional investors may vary in their stock selection abil-
ities. Unfortunately, our data does not differentiate between different types of institutional investors. We leave this issue for
future research with more detailed and complete data.
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